IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR’S RECOMMENDATIONS

TO ADDRESS EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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Since = the official mission of UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston to the Philippines, extrajudicial executions continue.

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The nu= mber of political activists and members of civil society organizations extrajudicia= lly executed appears to have declined. Karapatan reports 70 victims in 20= 07[1] and 50 victims in 2008,[2] while Task Force Detainees of the Philippines reports 11 victims in 2007, and 4 victims in 2008.[3]

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The nu= mber of Filipino journalists killed appears to have grown. The National Union of Journalists in the Philippines reports 5 journalists killed in 2007, and 7 journalists killed in 2008.[4]

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Death = squad killings of alleged criminal offenders in Davao City have increased dramatically: 116 were stabbed or shot to death in 2007; 269 were killed in 2008; and 28 were summarily executed from January 1 to 22, 2= 009.[5]

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The FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP [FLAG] submits that among the reasons why the phenomenon of extrajudicial executions conti= nues is the lack of substantial progress in the implementation of UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s recommendations to address extrajudicial executions in = the Philippines.

The la= ck of substantial progress in the implementation of UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s recommendations may be explained by the derision expressed by key Cabinet members like Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales, who attacked both UN Special Rapporteur Alston and his report and suggested that it should not be given importance because it was written by a mere “muchacho.”

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Under = the Philippine system of government, cabinet secretaries are under the control = of the President and are her alter ego= s. Accordingly, their acts, “performed= and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” [6]

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The Pr= esident has never disapproved or reprobated the statements of her Justice Secretary. The Justice Secretary’s view is therefore also the President’s view on the matter and explains why one cannot expect that the Philippine government wi= ll seriously attend to UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s report or implement its recommendations.

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This p= aper discusses the status of some of UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s recommendati= ons in the light of recent developments; copies of presidential directives refe= rred to herein are available at the Philippine government’s website, while copie= s of Supreme Court decisions are available at the Court’s website. Copies of other documents referred to i= n this paper are available at FLAG, u= pon request.

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Philippine Government’s Counterinsurgency Program Relatively Unchanged

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UN Spe= cial Rapporteur Alston recommends the elimination of extrajudicial executions fr= om counterinsurgency operations.[7] The case of Raymond and Reynaldo Ma= nalo[8] is instructive of the way extrajudicial executions are incorporated into counterinsurgency operations.

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The Brothers Manalo were forcibly abdu= cted on February 14, 2006 in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, in successive operations by combined military and CAFGU elements, based on “the suspicion that [they] w= ere either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors w= ere looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, [their] brother.”[9] For 18 months, they were held incommunicado in secret detention places; during their captivity, they were beaten severely, bathed in their urine, whipped with a chain with a barbed wire attached to its end, had wat= er poured into their nostrils, and made to eat rotten food. They were threatened with harm or death= if they revealed what had been done to them, or escaped.[10] The Brothers Manalo escaped from their captors on 13 August 2007.

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During= their 18 months of captivity, the Brothers M= analo witnessed the killing of “NPA sympathizers” during military operations call= ed “Operation Lubog” in Bataan. Raymond Manalo testified that he was taken along with soldiers during these operations, and that he witnessed the killing of an old man engaged in kaingin; “the soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time= , in another ‘Operation Lubog,’ Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they ar= rived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son= right before Raymond’s eyes.”[11]

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During= their captivity, the Brothers Manalo = also saw the corpse of a prisoner being burned; on two occasions, they saw unifo= rmed soldiers unload several corpses from a 6 x 6 military truck; the corpses we= re later burned. They also saw one Aet= a prisoner shot and executed inside the military camp; his body was later burned. They also witnessed the mu= rder of Manuel Merino, abducted alon= g with Sherlyn Cadapan and Karen Empeno, the University of th= e Philippines students.[12]

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The ca= se of the Brothers Manalo illustrates a “counterinsurgency command policy” that remains unchanged, as shown by rece= nt presidential directives.

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Presid= ential directives issued after the Alston mission simply reiterate government’s “strategy to realize a war of rapid conclusion”[13] “to achieve a strategic defeat of the communist terrorist movement by 2010,= to destroy the Abu Sayaff and other terrorist groups, and to contain the secessionist groups in order to establish a physically, and psychologically secure environment conducive to national development.”[14] Since 2007, presidential directives hav= e not specified guidelines to ensure that counterinsurgency operations do not lead to, or result in, extrajudicial executions. Instead, presidential directives mandate other acts supportive of its “war of rapid conclusion.”

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While Administrative Order 197,[15] for example, orders the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces= of the Philippines to “work closely with the Presidential Human Rights Committ= ee (PHRC) subcommittee on killings and disappearances for speedy action on cas= es and effective reforms to avoid abuses,” it also orders the defense establishment to “draft legislation … for safeguards against disclosure of military secrets and undue interference in military operations inimical to national security” and to “accelerate the recruitment, training, equipping = and deployment of CAFGUs in place of transferred troops.” Significantly, the Administrative Order= does not provide any standards or parameters to ensure that extrajudicial execut= ions are eliminated from CAFGU activities and operations.

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Administrative Order 211[16] establishes the Task Force Against Political Violence to “harness and mobil= ize government agencies, political groups, the religious, civil society and sectoral organizations and the public for the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of political violence, the care and protection of people and communities victimized and threatened with violence, and the promotion of a culture opposed to violence and for the advancement of reconciliation and peace.”[17] Political violence refers to “all forms = of violence particularly when perpetrated for political gains and goals, destabilization, abuse of power and other political excesses.”[18] It is important to note that Philippine= law has not criminalized “political violence,” so it makes no sense to create a task force to “prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish” a non-existent offense. While the Administrative = Order does not direct the newly created Task Force to work closely with the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG), the parallel membership in both bo= dies and their similar mandates point to their crucial roles in the “war of rapid conclusion.”

Executive Order 739[19] reorganizes the Peace and Order Council to address “Communist rebels” and “= put a stop to their ideological nonsense and their criminal acts once and for a= ll.”[20] It creates a Regional ISO Convergence Office in every region of the country, headed by the Infantry Division Commander, to “focus on the convergence and orchestration of internal security operations (ISO) efforts of civil authorities and agencies, military and police.”[21] It also places the management and super= vision of Civilian Volunteer Organizations under the Regional, Provincial, City or Municipal Director of the Philippine National Police.[22] Like other presidential directives, Exe= cutive Order 739 is devoid of guidelines to ensure the elimination of extrajudicial executions from internal security operations.

Significantly, the President ha= s not ordered her security forces to cease the labeling of political and civil society organizations, nor to introduce transparency into the orders of bat= tle and other similar lists or databases maintained by the military establishme= nt.

In defending the practice of la= beling individuals and organizations as “enemies of the state,” then Armed Forces = Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. insisted it “is reserved only to t= hose who subscribe to violence and violate the sovereignty of the Philippines as an independent and democratic state. … Let me emphasize that we = do not arbitrarily label groups as members of the CPP-NPA-NDF. We base our claims on evidence of fact.= ”[23] His statements belie the fact that organizations such as FLAG, wh= ich do not meet Gen. Esperon’s criteria, have found themselves labeled as “enemies= .” His statements are also extremely danger= ous for they sanction the practice of labeling based on what Gen. Esperon calls “evidence of fact.”

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That a database or similar meth= od identifying “enemies of the state” exists is beyond doubt;[24] whether corrections have been made to delist persons or organizations from = that database or similar mechanism is not known.

It is, however, possible for individuals or organizations listed in the order of battle or similar lists= , or included in databases maintained by the military forces and law enforcement offices, to have information about them removed, destroyed or rectified thr= ough the use of the writ of habeas data<= /i>.[25]

But the power of the writ of habeas data is largely untested. This may be traced to ambiguities in the Rule,[26] including costs associated with its use.[27] Since the writ of habeas data became available a year ago, only four cases were f= iled before the Court of Appeals; two remain pending. In the two resolved cases, the Court of Appeals did not grant the relief sought as one case was terminated upon mot= ion of petitioner, with the conformity of the respondent,[28]<= ![endif]> while the other case was denied for lack of substantial evidence.[29]

The principle of command responsibility, while incorporated in Philippine law and jurisprudence, imp= oses administrative and civil—not criminal—liability.

Executive Order 226,[30] issued some fourteen years ago, institutionalizes the doctrine of “command responsibility” in “all government offices and at all levels of command in = the PNP and other law enforcement agencies.” It imposes administrative liability on any government official, supervisor, officer of the PNP and any law enforcement agency[31] for “neglect of duty,” i.e., “if he has knowledge that a crime or offense s= hall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates= , or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he= did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediat= ely after its commission.”[32] It establishes “presumption of knowledg= e” whereby “A government official or supervisor, or PNP commander, is presumed to have knowledge of the commissi= on of irregularities or criminal offenses in any of the following circumstance= s: a. when the irregularities or illegal a= cts are widespread within his area of jurisdiction; b. when the irregularities = or illegal acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or c. when members of his immediate staff or office personn= el are involved.”[33]

The Supreme Court upheld the principle of command responsibility in civil suits. In Aberca v. Ver,[34] the Court held:

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“By this provision, the princip= le of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official r= elax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in= the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by= the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 w= as the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent t= o, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. Wh= ile it would certainly be so naive to expect that violators of human rights wou= ld easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible= for the transgression joint tortfeasors.”

In his presentation before the = National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances: Searching for Solutions, convened b= y the Supreme Court in 2007, then Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Hermogenes = C. Esperon, Jr., announced that “…, the AFP promulgated guidelines for the str= ict adherence to command responsibility. The duties of a commanding officer include taking into his custody erring milit= ary personnel, arresting and confining offenders, and determining the administrative liabilities of erring personnel. Commanding officers are required to deliver AFP personnel to civil authorities. Failure to do so coul= d mean dismissal from service or suffer other punishments as may be determined by court martial.”[35] Because the guidelines referred to by G= eneral Esperon are outside public domain, FLAG is not in a position to determine whether the guidelines do exist, what liability, if any, is imposed, and whether the principle of command responsibility is consistent with principles of international law.
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Dav= ao Death Squad Killin= gs Continue

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The Da= vao Death Squad has stepped up its operations, despite UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s recommendation to end the use of the death squad in the city.[36] Worse, death squad operations have spre= ad to the nearby provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao del Norte and to the island= s of the Visayas and Luzon.[37]

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Victim= s are those allegedly involved in the drug trade or drug use, those allegedly eng= aged in crimes against property (theft and robbery), or known young “gangsters” = or members of “violent gangs.” Some v= ictims were shot on sight, while others were abducted, and their bodies, peppered = with gun shot wounds or stab wounds, were later dumped or thrown.[38]

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When t= he proposal to restore the death penalty emerged in recent weeks, Davao City M= ayor Rodrigo Duterte announced before the local media: “the death penalty has ne= ver been lifted in Davao City.” In one of his recent media interviews, Mayor Duterte reiterated: “Davao City is a dangerous= place for criminals. Criminals deserve d= eath because Davao people love peace. This is not a p= lace for criminals.”[39]

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The lo= ng string of killings in Davao City started in 199= 6 and no one has ever been prosecuted for the killings. The Philippine National Police (PNP) has continued to deny the existence of the Davao Death Squad and has, instead, attributed the killings to rival criminal groups or gangs. The PNP has also denied accountability = for the killings, citing the lack of witnesses.[40]

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Despit= e denials by barangay officials, the watc= h list has never been abolished. Suspected targets are first warned to stop their activities or leave Davao City. If they continue, they will likely be a= bducted or killed on sight.[41]

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No ind= ependent investigation into the Davao Death Squad killings at the national or local level has yet been undertaken.

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“It is= an open secret in Davao City that the Mayor and the PNP kn= ow who are engaged in the killings. For a= s long as these incidents are protected by the local government, they will never be solved.”[42]

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Philip= pine law vests the power of operational supervision and control over PNP units in ci= ty and municipal mayors;[43] under the law, only the President is empowered to suspend the power of operational supervision and control of any local executive over police units assigned or stationed for (a) frequent unauthor= ized absences, (b) abuse of authority, (c) providing material support to criminal elements, or (d) engaging in acts inimical to national security or which ne= gate the effectiveness of the peace and order campaign.[44]

The President has not withdrawn from Ma= yor Duterte his power of operational supervision and control over the Philippine National Police.

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No Significant Increase in Prosecution of Offend= ers

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The attainment of convictions in a significant number of cases involving extrajudicial executions, as recommen= ded by UN Special Rapporteur Alston,[45] depends largely on the prosecution of offenders. But data from the Integrated Bar of the= Philippines and the Supreme Court indicate= a lack of significant progress in increasing the number of prosecutions of th= ose responsible for extrajudicial executions in the Philippines.

In 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted a legal audit of cases involving extrajudicial killings.[46]   In determining whether cases involve extrajudicial killings, the Bar applied the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Adminis= trative Order 25-2007: “In determining whe= ther the crime is a ‘political killing’ the following factors, among others, sha= ll be considered: (1) political affiliation of the victim; (2) method of attac= k; and (3) reports that state agents are involved in the commission of the cri= me or have acquiesced in them.”

The Bar initially identified 405 c= ases but, after applying the Court’s guidelines, qualified 121 as cases of extrajudicial killings. The exclud= ed cases, the Bar reports, involve “summary executions, killings perpetrated b= y hired killers and those allegedly perpetrated by the leftists through its ‘purging activities.’”[47] Of the 121 cases, only 38 cases were fi= led in court, while 83 cases “have not even reached the courts.”[48]

According to the Bar, of the 38 ca= ses filed in court, 28 are ongoing trial while 10 were dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence or lack of merit.

The Bar reports that of the 83 cas= es which “have not even reached the courts,” 38 cases were not filed because t= he perpetrators could not be identified; 15 cases were archived or closed beca= use the victims’ families refused to cooperate in the investigation; 4 cases could = not proceed because the accused had not been apprehended; and 26 cases are still under investigation.

Among the reasons why victim’s fam= ilies are reluctant to cooperate in investigations is their belief that government agents are responsible for the killings coupled with investigations conduct= ed by investigators associated with the same branch or agency as the suspected perpetrators. This belief is exace= rbated by their very real fear that if they come out openly, they may be identified and subjected to some form of retribution by colleagues of the suspects. Hence victims’ families distrust the investigation and refuse to cooperate with it.

In FLAG’s view, whether victims’ families cooperate or not with an investigation is incidental to the fact that law enforcers are required by law to investigate crimes. Admittedly, cooperation by victims’ families may make the investigative work of law enforcers easier but it does not remove from= them their duty to investigate. Citing the lack of cooperation by victims’ famil= ies, FLAG submits, has become a convenient excuse for law enforcers not to comply with their duty to investigate.

Data from the Supreme Court, on the oth= er hand, differs from the Bar’s findings. The Court-compiled List of C= ourts with Pending Cases Regarding Extra-Judicial Killings of Political Ideologist and Members of Media as of April 3, 2008, contains 82 cases involving t= he killings of reporters and broadcast journalists, a publicist, political activists and members of civil society organizations, a pastor, soldiers, police officers, and elected officials (a congressman, barangay captains, mayors, and a councilor). The kinds of cases in the list include murder, double murder, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, frustrated murder, homicide, frustrated homicide, robbery with homicide, robbery, and rebellion.

Based on the list, three cases were dec= ided: in one case, the accused was found guilty; in another case, the accused was acquitted; while the decision in the third case was not indicated. Two cases were dismissed, while three c= ases were archived because the accused are at large. One case was remanded to the Prosecutor’s Office for further investigation. The Court-compiled = list also indicates that trial is ongoing in only 38 cases.

To enhance coordination and cooperation between the National Prosecution Service and other government agencies for the successful investigation and prosecution of political and media killings, the President issued Administrative Order 181,[49] which, among others, directed the assignment of a public prosecutor at the start of a criminal investigation and throughout the criminal proceedings, except in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The Administrative Order requires the c= onduct of a preliminary investigation by a separate and different prosecutor from = the prosecutor assigned to handle the case through most of the criminal proceed= ings.

In the meantime, Senate Bill 21= 93, the Anti Salvaging Law, was fil= ed and is currently pending at the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes and Laws. The bill seeks to qualify extrajudicial killings as “heinous crimes” subject to the death penalty.

The bill defines salvaging as “= the killing of any person by any public officer, person in authority or agent o= f a person in authority,” and extrajudicial killing as “any killing other than = that imposed by the state pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on hein= ous crimes; ‘extrajudicial killing’ means a deliberated killing not authorized = by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all= the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

The most disturbing aspect of t= he bill is its imposition of the death penalty. FLAG has long opposed c= apital punishment and opposes its imposition on perpetrators of extrajudicial executions. FLAG believes the death penalty will not deter those responsible for extrajudicial executions; the death penalty will not contribute to more efficient, more professional investigations; the death penalty will not res= ult in greater convictions; the death penalty will not reverse the policy that encourages and facilitates extrajudicial executions; and the death penalty = will not eradicate extrajudicial executions from the Philippines.

On 25 September 2007, the Supre= me Court adopted the Rule on the Writ = of Amparo,[50] which, in the words of the Chief Justice, “will provide the victims of extral= egal killings and enforced disappearances the protection they need and the promi= se of vindication for their rights. This rule also empowers our courts to issue reliefs that may be granted through judicial orders of protection, producti= on, inspection, and other reliefs to safeguard one’s life and liberty. The writ= of amparo shall hold public authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high standard of official conduct a= nd hold them accountable to our people. The sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their right to life and liberty is threatened or violated, = they will find vindication in our courts of justice.”[51] In addition to provi= ding protection and relief for the victims, the writ of amparo “facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators a= s it will inevitably lead to subsequent investigation and action.”[52]

FLAG conducted a preliminary rev= iew of the effectiveness of the writ of am= paro one year after it was adopted.[53] FLAG found that the writ remains under-u= tilized or, perhaps, even mis-utilized.=

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From O= ctober 2007 to January 2009, 33 petitions were filed either before the Supreme Cou= rt (which remanded the petitions to the Court of Appeals) or the Court of Appeals.   Of the 33 petitions, 26 = were decided upon, 6 remain pending, while 1 was remanded to the Regional Trial Court and consolidated with the case pending at the lower court.

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Of the= 26 decided cases, only four were granted,[54] while two were partially granted;[55] four were terminated upon agreement of the parties;[56] one was terminated with the withdrawal of the petition;[57] six were dismissed for lack of substantial evidence;[58] while nine were dismissed for lack of merit (the cases did not involve extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances or threats thereof).[59]

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When grant= ed, the writ of amparo provides extraordinary relief. In Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo v. Secretary of National Defense, et. al.,[60] the Court ordered respondents to (a) furnish petitioners and the Court all official and unofficial investigation reports; (b) confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo= and Donald Caigas; and (c) produce to the Court all medical reports, records and charts of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, including a list of all medical personnel (military and civilian) who atten= ded to petitioners from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

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In Erlinda T. Cadapan and Concepcion E. E= mpeno v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al.,[61] the Court ordered respondents to (a) immediately release Sherlyn Cadapa= n, Karen Empeno and Manuel Merino and (b) resume the investigation “so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible.”

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In Leny Robinos and Lolita Robinos v. Glo= ria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al.,[62] the Court (a) ordered= the respondents to desist or refrain from approaching, communicating or committ= ing any act which would threaten or violate the rights to life and security of petitioners and their family, (b) placed petitioners and their family under= the protection of a parish priest, (c) allowed the inspection of various detent= ion places, (d) directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines to produce mission orders, investigation reports, letter or files, including electronic data, which constitute evidence relevant to the petition, and (e) directed the Ch= ief of Staff to oversee that the Court’s orders are complied with in good faith= , “under pain of direct contempt.”

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In Mary Jean B. Tagitis v. Lt. Gen. Alexa= nder Yano, et. al.,[63]= the Court found that the case involved an “enforced disappearance within the meaning of the United Nations instruments as used in the Amparo Rule,” and directed the respondents to (a) exert extraordinary diligence and effort to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis and extend the privileges of the writ of amparo on him and his family; and (b) submit a monthly report of their acti= ons to the Court “as a way of periodic review to enable this Court to monitor t= he action of respondents.”

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In Edita D. Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. = al.,[64] the Court ordered respondents to (a) make available and provide copies to petitioner of all documents and records relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph Burgos; (b) continue with and conduct a full and thorough investigation and cause the immediate filing of the appropriate charges against those responsible; (c) conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding the loss of license plate no. TAB 194 and possible involvement = of AFP personnel; and (d) submit compliance reports within 10 days after the completion of the investigation.

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In Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina v.= Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, et. al.,[65] the Court, while “not find[ing] any link between respondent individual military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson,” nonetheless ordered (a) the inspect= ion of various camps and (b) a thorough and impartial investigation, the immedi= ate filing of charges against those responsible and the submission of a written report to the Court within three months from notice.

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Surprising= ly, in Lourdes D. Rubrico, et. al. v. Glor= ia Macapagal Arroyo, et. al.,[66] which the Court dismissed for lack of substantial evidence, the Court nonetheless directed respondents to (a) ensure that their investigations are diligently pursued to bring perpetrators to justice, and (b) regularly upda= te the petitioners and the Court on the status of their investigation.<= /p>
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In a s= tark departure from rulings of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court Br= anch LXIII of La Trinidad, Benguet, upheld President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent to a petition for a writ of amparo, finding that “… a Petition for a Writ of Amparo is not = by any stretch of imagination a niggling vexing or annoying court case that Her Excellency should be shielded from. ... x x x The duty of the President “to faithfully execute the laws of t= he land” places the Chief Executive under the rule of law.” In Arthur Balao, et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al.,[67] the trial court found “the violation of James Balao’s rights to life, liber= ty and security is as palpable as it is real” and so ordered respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or confined; (b) release James Balao; and (c) cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon him.

IALAG Still Operational

IALAG = (Inter Agency Legal Action Group) h= as not been abolished, despit= e UN Special Rapporteur Alston’s recommendation.[68] In recent years, the investigation and prosecution of “national security offenses”—IALAG’s principal mandate—has yielded two legal strategies: the use of subversion to prove rebellio= n and the use of the “John Doe information.”

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The re= peal of the Anti Subversion law (RA 1700, as amended) has compelled government to f= ile rebellion charges against its perceived “enemies.” But because government cannot prove the essential elements of the crime of rebellion, government prosecutors now re= ly on the elements of subversion (e.g., possession of subversive materials, membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines) to sustain rebellion charges against the accused.

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In 200= 7, the Supreme Court ruled that mere membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines does not constitute rebellion.[69] Yet, government prosecutors have appare= ntly ignored the ruling.

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A case= in point is People v. Aristedes Sarmiento, e= t. al., Criminal Case No. TG-5273-06,[70] where government prosecutors submitted evidence of subversion to support charges of rebellion against the accused. In its Order of 20 August 2008, the trial court held that “the crime= of rebellion did not exist under the circumstances of their arrest” as the prosecution mainly relied on the alleged membership of the accused with the CPP/NPA to indict the accused with the crime of rebellion. The trial court thus dismissed the char= ge of rebellion and ordered the immediate release of the accused.

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The second legal strategy is the use of the “John Doe informat= ion” in contravention of Circular No. 50 of the Department of Justice,[71] which has resulted in the arrest and detention of human rights activists and members of civil society organizations.

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As ear= ly as 1990, the Department of Justice recognized the “practice of some prosecutor= s of filing informations against persons who, apart from merely being identified= as ‘John Does,’ are not otherwise particularly described to distinguish them or set them apart from other persons. This practice has resulted in instances = where the names of persons who are subsequently arrested are substituted in place= of the ‘John Does’ in the information even though the evidence extant in the records of the case does not show any substantial identity between the form= er and the latter.”[72]

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In the= same circular, the Department of Justice warns against the unconstitutionality of warrants of arrest resulting from a “John Doe information:” “Warrants of arrest against ‘John Does,= ’ the witnesses against whom could not or would not identify them, are in the nat= ure of general warrants and belong to a class of writs long proscribed and anathemized as ‘totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.’ It is violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. (Pangandaman v= s. Casar, 159 SCRA 599).”[73]

Thus the Justice Department directed its prosecutors, “wheneve= r a complaint implicating a ‘John Doe’ is filed … to: elicit from the witnesses other appropriate descriptions to particularly describe a ‘John Doe’ to distinguish him or set him apart from the others; and to place a new name in the information in lieu of a ‘John Doe’ only when the description of this ‘= John Doe’ as appearing in the sworn statement of a witness substantially tallies with the description of the person placed in ‘John Doe's’ stead.”

Yet, government prosecutors have begun to file complaints implicating unnamed, un-described “John/Jane Does” in clear violation of the Department’s directive. The case of People v. Rustom Simbulan, et. al., Criminal Case No. CR-06-8525[74] is an excellent example of the use of the “John Doe information” to arrest = and detain some 70 persons who represent practically the entire leadership of t= he mass movement of Southern Tagalog. Among those arrested and detained is FLA= G member Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, = Jr., who represents workers, labor unions, and the urban poor and who has argued public policy and constitutional questions before the Supreme Court. He is = also the general legal counsel of Kilusa= ng Mayo Uno, which government has branded an “enemy of the state.”<= /p>

Witness Protection Program Still Not Reformed

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Reform= ing the Witness Protection Program, as recommended by UN Special Rapporteur Alston,= [75] requires legislation. Several bills have been filed before both houses of Congress and are now pending before their respective committees;[76] these include:

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1&nb= sp;       House Bill 4080, the Anti Corruption Whistleblowers and Witnesses Act of 2008, which institutes a system of protection and rewards and benefits for witnesses in cases of gra= ft and corruption;

2&nb= sp;       House Bill 385 and its counterpart Senate Bill 1999, An Act Amending Republic Act 6981 Otherwise Known as the “Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act” and for Other Purposes, which ame= nds the Witness Protection Program by (a) entitling witnesses in the program to hospitalization benefits while in the safe house; (b) entitling witnesses’ minor or dependent children to free public education from primary level to college; and (c) allowing the perpetuation of testimonies of witnesses under Rule 134 of the Rules of Court;

3      = Senate Bill 260, the Informer= s and Anti Corruption Witness Protection Act of 2004, which establishes a mechanism to protect informants on graft and corrupt activities through, am= ong others, a monetary-based rewards system and the grant of immunity from civi= l or criminal liability;

4&nb= sp;       Senate Bill 2081, An Act Amen= ding Republic Act 6981 Otherwise Known as an Act Providing for a Witness Protect= ion, Security and Benefit Program and for Other Purposes, which amends the Witness Protection Program only with respect to witnesses in legislative investigations by creating a separate Witness Protection, Security and Bene= fit Program for resource persons and/or witnesses in legislative investigations= to be implemented by the Senate or the House of Representatives; and

5&nb= sp;       Senate Bill 2650, the Witness Confidentiality Act, which requires nondisclosure in open court of the residence address, telephone number, name and place of business, business address and telephone number of any victim or witness to a crime during tri= al or hearing.

Not one of the bills removes the administration of the Witness Protection Program from the Department of Justice; not a single bill amends the penalty for interfering with witnesse= s.

Since most of the bills deal largely wi= th witnesses in cases involving graft and corruption, only House Bill 385 and = its counterpart Senate Bill 1999, and perhaps Senate Bill 2650, could conceivab= ly impact on addressing extrajudicial executions in the country.

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In add= ition to the Witness Protection Program administered by the Department of Justice, t= he Supreme Court is looking into the accreditation of private individuals and institutions capable of keeping witnesses and victims safe.

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The Su= preme Court’s Rule on the Writ of Amparo[77]<= ![endif]> establishes the interim or preliminary relief available to petitioners; these include the Temporary Protection Order and the Witness Protection Ord= er,[78] which may place the petitioner, the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, and witnesses under the protection of an accredited perso= n or private institution pursuant to guidelines adopted by the Court.

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On 17 = October 2007, the Court Administrator presided over a consultative meeting, where it presented for critique the “Proposed Guidelines on the Accreditation of Persons or Private Institutions for the Purpose of Providing Temporary Protection to Petitioner, Aggrieved Party, a= nd any member of the Immediate Family or to a Witness under the Rule on the Wr= it of Amparo.”

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The pr= oposed guidelines, consisting of 15 sections, “seek to enforce standards in the accreditation of persons or private institutions undertaking temporary protection to petitioner, aggrieved party, and any member of the immediate family or witness in extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof for the purpose of authorizing, regulating and monitoring t= he operation of such person or private institutions.”[79] Among others, the proposed guidelines s= et forth the requirements for accreditation as well as the accreditation proce= ss.

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In FLAG’s view, the proposed guideli= nes, while welcome, could be enhanced by (a) specifying the accreditation of pri= vate institutions or persons, not “protection facilities;” (b) including a secti= on describing the rights and obligations of accredited private institutions or persons;[80] (c) reconsidering the requirements for accreditation; (d) including measure= s to shield accredited private institutions and persons from danger, threats and harassment; and (e) incorporating safeguards against the accreditation of unscrupulous or spurious institutions or persons. FLAG formally submitted its comments on the proposed guidelines, which are now u= nder consideration by the Office of the Court Administrator.[81]

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Congressional Oversight Still Elusive=

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Finall= y UN Special Rapporteur Alston recommended the revocation of all directives, memoranda and orders that impede congressional oversight.[82]

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Execut= ive Order 464 and Memorandum Circular 108 have since been revoked;[83] however, in FLAG’s view, the revocation is devoid of meaning because government now relies on executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.

FLAG submits that executive privilege may not be invoked to conceal a crime. Executive privilege is not absolute: the “privilege must be balanced against= the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice.”[84] The Supreme Court, in Senate v. Executive Secretary Ermita, further held:

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“Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the c= ourts or the public is recognized only in relation to certain types of informa= tion of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be val= id or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in whi= ch it is made. Noticeably absent is a= ny recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of = the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy in favor of disclosure.”

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However,= in the same case, the Court stressed: “… the oversight function of Congress ma= y be facilitated by compulsory process = only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”

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The Court revisited the scope of executive privilege in Neri v. Senate Committee = on Accountability of Public Officers, et. al.[85]<= ![endif]> The Court cited earlier rulings reiterating “governmental privilege against pub= lic disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters,”[86] a= nd affirming “a recognition of the confidentiality of presidential conversatio= ns, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”[87]

The Court upheld the doctrine of presidential communications privilege,= and laid bare its element: first, “the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power;” second, “the communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor= of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President;” and third, “the presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence a= nd by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.”

This d= ecision effectively diminishes the power of the Philippine legislature to enforce congressional oversight.

Quezon City, Philippines, 30 January 2009.

MARIA SOCORRO I. DIOKNO

Secretary General

[1] Karapatan Monitor, July-September 2008.

[2] Southern Mindanao Regional Human Rights Situation Year = End Report for 2008, 10 December 2008.

[3] Data provided by Task Force Det= ainees of the Philippines via email on 23 January 2009.

[4] Information provided by the Nat= ional Union of Journalists in the Philippines via text messages on 26 January 2009; names of journalists killed available= at http://www.nujp.org.

[5] Atty. Manuel P. Quibod, FLAG Davao City Report on the ‘DDS’ Killings in Conne= ction with the Alston Recommendations, 24 January 2009.

[6] Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Cruz, Philippine Politic= al Law, 1998 Ed., at page 213.

[7] Paragraph 67, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[8] Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo v. Secretary of National Defense, et. al., CA GR AM= PARO No. 00001, 26 December 2007, and Th= e Hon. Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines v. Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, GR No. 180906, 7 Oct= ober 2008.

[9] Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo v. Secretary of National Defense, et. al., CA GR AM= PARO No. 00001, 26 December 2007.

[10] See, court records, Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo v. Secretary of National Defense, et. al., CA GR AMPARO No. 0000= 1, 26 December 2007, and The Hon. Secr= etary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines v. Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, GR No. 180906, 7 October 2008.

[11] The Hon. Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines v. Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, GR No. 180906, 7 Oct= ober 2008.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Article 6.1, 2^nd par= agraph, Administrative Order 169, Amending = the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations of the Armed Forces of the P= hilippines Modernization Program, 30 January 2007.

[14] 2^nd Whereas Clause, Administrative Order 218, Reorganiz= ing the Department of National Defense to Strengthen its Capability and Ensure = its Efficiency to Adequately Respond to Current Exigencies in National Security= , to Achieve the Implementation of its Defense Reform Program, and to Attain All= its Other Legally Mandated Goals, 18 January 2008.

[15] Untitled, 25 September 2007.

[16] Creating a Task Force against Political Violence, 26 November 2007.

[17] Section 1, Administrative Order= 211.

[18] 4^th Whereas Clause, Administrative Order 211.

[19] Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council, 19 August 2008.

[20] 4^th Whereas Clause in relation to Sections 2 and 3, Executive Order 739.

[21] Section 5, Executive Order 739.=

[22] Section 3, last paragraph, Exec= utive Order 739.

[23] General Hermogenes C. Esperon J= r., Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, The AFP in a Democracy: Protecting Human Rights, 16 July 2007; paper presented before the Nati= onal Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances:<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Searching for Solutions, convened b= y the Supreme Court on July 16 and 17, 2007, at the Manila Hotel Manila.

[24] See, for example, the Armed Forces of the Philippines power point presentati= on entitled Knowing the Enemy, and= “Trinity of War Book III” published by the Headquarters of the Northern Luzon Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

[25] A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 22 January= 2008.

[26] Among others, the Rule on the W= rit of Habeas Data provides enough defens= es to significantly weaken its effectiveness as a remedy to protect the right to privacy.

[27] Unlike a petition for the writ = of amparo, a petition for the writ of= habeas data is subject to docket a= nd other legal fees.

[28] In Luz v. Esperon and John Does, C= A-GR SP No. 00023-WRA/HD, 16 June 2008, the petitioner alleged that he was placed under military surveillance and that there was an on-going case buildup aga= inst him; he asked the court to suppress any database or report that threatens h= is rights to security and privacy. The respondents denied the petitioner’s allegations and consequently issued a Memorandum confirming that all Armed Forces major services did not conduct any surveillance or case buildup acti= vity against the petitioner. Relying on= the respondents’ assurance, the petitioner asked that the case be terminated. The Court, with the respondent’s confor= mity, thus terminated the case.

[29] In Francis Saez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., CA GR 00024, the Court found = that no evidence was presented to prove a threat or violation of the petitioner’s rights, hence the petition was dismissed.

[30] Institutionalization of the Doctrine of “Command Responsibility” in All Government Offices, Particularly at All Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and Other Law Enforcement Agencies, 17 February 1995.

[31] Section 4, Executive Order 226.=

[32] Section 1, Executive Order 226.=

[33] Section 2, Executive Order 226.=

[34] 160 SCRA 590 (1988).=

[35] General Hermogenes C. Esperon J= r., Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, The AFP in a Democracy: Protecting Human Rights, 16 July 2007; paper presented before the Nati= onal Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances:<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Searching for Solutions, convened b= y the Supreme Court on July 16 and 17, 2007, at the Manila Hotel Manila.

[36] Paragraph 68, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[37] Atty. Manuel P. Quibod, FLAG Davao City Report on the ‘DDS’ Killings in Conne= ction with the Alston Recommendations, 24 January 2009.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43]<= /a> Section 51, Republic Act 6975, Department of Interior and Local Gover= nment Act of 1990.

[44] Section 51, paragraph 3, Republic Act 6975, Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990.<= /p>

[45] Paragraph 69, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[46] Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Ai= d, Legal Audit of Cases of Extrajudicial Killings in the Phil= ippines: Final Narrative Report, March 28 to Dec= ember 12, 2008.

[47] Integrated Bar of the Philippin= es National Committee on Legal Aid, Le= gal Audit of Cases of Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Final Narrative Report, March 28 to Dec= ember 12, 2008 at page 16.

[48] Integrated Bar of the Philippin= es National Committee on Legal Aid, Le= gal Audit of Cases of Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Final Narrative Report, March 28 to Dec= ember 12, 2008 at page 29.

[49] Directing the Cooperation and Coordination Between the National Prosecution Service a= nd Other Concerned Agencies of Government for the Successful Investigation and Prosecution of Political and Media Killings, July 3, 2007.

[50] A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 Septemb= er 2007; amended 16 October 2007.

[51] Jay B. Rempillo, SC Approves Rule on Writ of Amparo, posted September 25, 2007, http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph

[52] The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines vs. Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, SC GR 180906, 7 Oct= ober 2008.

[53] FLAG is in the process of evaluating each Amparo decision, with a view to proposing amendments to the Supreme Court on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

[54]<= /a> Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo v. Secreta= ry of National Defense, et. al., CA GR AMPARO No. 00001, Erlinda T. Cadapan and Concepcion E. Empeno v. Gloria Macapagal Arr= oyo, et. al., CA GR SP No. 00002, Le= ny Robinos and Lolita Robinos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., CA GR W= RA 00004, and Mary Jean B. Tagitis v. = Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al., CA GR AMPARO No. 00009.

[55] Edita D. Burgos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., CA GR SP No. 00008-WA, and Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina v.= Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Chief of Staff, AFP, et. al., CA GR SP 00010 WR/A.<= o:p>

[56] Maria Ortiz and Leny Panganiban v. Lt. Col. Ramon Tello, etc., CA GR SP No. 00005, Roperto Malapute v. Lt. Col.= Ramon Tello, etc., CA GR WRA No. 00006, Jose Pernia v. Major General Delfin Bangit, et. al., CA GR SP No. 00014= -WA, and Guillermo M. Luz v. Gen. Hermog= enes Esperon and John Does, CA GR No. SP No. 00023-WRA/HD.=

[57] Jefferson D. Castro v. Jesus Totanes or Batotanes and Commanding Officer Philippine A= ir Force, CA GR SP No. 00028.

[58]<= /a> Lourdes D. Rubrico, et. al., v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., CA GR SP No. 00003, Lorena Santos v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al. , CA GR WRA N= o. 00012, Arturo Lozada v. Gloria Maca= pagal Arroyo, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 00017, Nilo Baculo, Sr. v. Atty. Paulino Salvador Leachon, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 0= 0022 WR/A, Francis Saez v. Gloria Macapa= gal Arroyo, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 00024 WOA, and Hargie S. Pagayao v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et. al. , CA GR WR/A No. 00025.

[59]<= /a> Rev. Fr. Robert Reyes v. Raul M. Gonzales, et. = al., CA GR No. 00011, Alfreda Puyos Orli= na, et. al. v. Charlie del Valle, et. al., CA GR WRA No. 00013, Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. v. Judge Thelma Pinero-Cruz, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 00015= , Rev. Fr. Romualdo Edgardo V. Cadiz v. Rodrigo Gaddu= ang, et. al. , CA GR AMPARO No. 00016, Antonio A. Funcion, Sr. v. Hon. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig<= /span>, CA GR SP No. 00018, Chee Ho= ng Leong aka William Chee v. Department of Justice, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 00019, and Kriss M= cCord v. Department of Justice, et. al. , CA GR SP No. 00020, Sandy Vibar Domingo v. Hon. Milagros G. Quijano, et. al., CA GR SP WR/A No. 00029, Ana Maria Paglinawan v. Hon. Raul Gonzales, et. al., CA GR WRA = No. 00030.

[60] CA GR AMPARO No. 00001, 26 Dece= mber 2007 affirmed by the Supreme Court in GR No. 180906, 7 October 2008.

[61] CA GR SP No. 00002, 17 Septembe= r 2008.

[62] CA GR WRA 00004, 29 November 20= 08.

[63] CA GR AMPARO No. 00009, 7 March= 2008.

[64] CA GR SP No. 00008-WA, 17 July = 2008.

[65] CA GR SP 00010 WR/A, 17 Septemb= er 2008.

[66] CA GR SP No. 00003, 31 July 200= 8.

[67]<= /a> SP No. 08-AMP-0001, 19 January 2009.

[68] Paragraph 70, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[69] Ladlad, et. al. v. Senior State Prosecutor, e= t. al., GR No. 172010-72, Maza, et= . al. v. Gonzales, et. al., GR No. 172014-76 and Beltran v. People of the Philippines, et. al., GR = No. 175013, 1 June 2007.

[70] Tried before the Regional Trial= Court Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Cavite.

[71] Series of 1990, 29 October 1990= .

[72] First and second paragraphs, DOJ Circular 50, Series of 1990.

[73] Third paragraph, DOJ Circular 5= 0, Series of 1990.

[74] Pending before the Regional Tri= al Court Branch 39, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.

[75] Paragraph 71, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[76] House Bills were referred to th= e House Committee on Justice, while the Senate Bills were referred to the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

[77] A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 Septemb= er 2007; amended 16 October 2007.

[78] Section 14, Rule on the Writ of= Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 September 2007; amended 16 October 2007.=

[79] Section 2, Proposed Guidelines on the Accreditation of Persons or Private Institutions for the Purpose of Providing Temporary Protection to Petitione= r, Aggrieved Party, and any member of the Immediate Family or to a Witness und= er the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.=

[80]<= /a> FLAG proposed the inclusion of a section that defines the rights and obligations of accredited private institutions and persons, to wit: (a) Not to disclose the exact location wh= ere temporary protection is provided, unless specifically ordered to do so by t= he amparo Court, Justice or Judge and= only in confidence; (b) Not to disclose the name(s) of the person(s) in whose custody the protected persons are placed, unless specifically ordered to do= so by the amparo Court, Justice or= Judge and only in confidence; (c) To take whatever measures are necessary to prov= ide temporary protection, including immediately transferring the protected pers= ons should circumstances such as threats, harassment, surveillance and the like require; (d) To inform the amparo <= /i>Court, Justice or Judge, of any extraordinary measures taken to provide temporary protection and the circumstances or reasons for taking such measures; (e) To present the protected persons before the amparo Court, Justice or Judge, should their attendance be so required, under measures that ensure their safety; (f) To refuse or decline to accept any person referred by the amparo C= ourt, Justice or Judge, for valid reasons; (g) To terminate protection, where termination is needed to prevent any danger or harm falling on the institut= ion, its members, and the protected persons, with prior notice to the amparo Court, Justice or Judge, so= as to allow the amparo Court, Justice= or Judge to take such appropriate action as is necessary to ensure the safety = of the protected person; and (h) To comply with rules, guidelines and conditio= ns that the Supreme Court may hereafter impose.

[81] 1^st Indorsement date= d 5 November 2007 issued by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno; Letter of Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepano dated 12 December 2007.<= /p>

[82] Paragraph 76, Section XIII, Rep= ort of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Ph= ilip Alston, on His Mission to the Philippines (12-21 February 2007).

[83] Memorandum Circular 151, Revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108, 6 March 2008.

[84] Senate v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006, citing the ruling in U.S. v,= Nixon.

[85] GR No. 180643, 25 March 2008; Resolution, 4 September 2008.

[86] Citing Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133 (= 1998).

[87] Citing Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002.